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The understanding the effects of financial reforms on financial constraints and firm 
investment is an important issue from both microeconomics and macroeconomics 
perspectives. This study empirically investigates the impact of financial reforms introduced in 
the 90s have succeeded in relaxing financial constraints to investment. The analysis is mainly 
based on the cross-industries panel of 501 Indian and Chinese non-financial large firms for 
the period from 2000 to 2009.  
By applying an Euler investment model, we examine the whether financial reforms have 
relaxed the constraints faced by firms for domestic and foreign investment decision. In 
particular, impact of financial reforms is measured through two ways: credit supply and 
foreign listing. Results find that firms are financially constrained in their investment decision. 
Intensity of financial constraints to investment is higher for Indian firms. Firms from both 
economies face financial constraints to their domestic as well as foreign investment. Further, 
results show that financial constraints to overall investment in Indian market decreases with 
business group affiliation, while state-ownership is beneficial for Chinese firms to overcome 
market imperfections. Similar pattern emerges for corporate domestic and foreign investment 
decisions in both countries. However, affiliation to business groups does not have any effect 
on financial constraints to foreign investment in Indian market.  
Next, the empirical results show that positive impact of financial reforms in terms of credit 
supply. In both markets, financial constraints to overall investment decreased due to 
improved supply of funds. The positive effect of reforms in terms of credit supply remains 
consistent for domestic and foreign investment. The magnitude of coefficient indicates   
intensity of financial constraints to investment at certain extent. In contrast, Indian large firms 
are not financially constrained. The impact of financial reforms is significant in Indian 
financial market, representing that financial policies targeting the credit excessive supply are 
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more successful in India. However, econometric results are not supportive to the positive role 
of foreign listing in mitigating financial constraints. Financial policies assisting firms to 
foreign list do not seems to have had much effect on the financial constraints to domestic or 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the framework of the thesis. It begins with a short 
background of the topic. It also provides the aims and objectives of this research. Following 
aims and objectives, the chapter provides the overview of the structure of the thesis. 
1.1. Background of study 
Investment decisions of firms occupy a prominent place in research discussion of economy’s 
long-term growth and business cycle fluctuations. This debate has been driven both by 
theoretical concerns and policy questions. The mutual aim is to understand the mechanisms 
that determine investment spending.  
Over the last few decades, literature concerning business investment has rotated around few 
theories in attempt to explain factors behind corporate financing policy. Pioneering work of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggested that market value of any firm and its cost of capital 
are independent of its investment decisions providing that there are no transaction cost, 
information asymmetry, taxes and bankruptcy cost.  
Perusing through more than forty years since then, researchers have attempted to expand the 
irrelevancy proposition to relax underlying assumptions to incorporate the role of financial 
constraints. Studies such as Opler et al., (1999); Myers and Majluf (1984); Myers (1984); 
Ross (1977); and Baxter (1967) have been guided by the MM propositions, attempt to relax 
assumptions by mostly relying on the arguments that asymmetric information and problems 
of contract enforcement lead to the emergence of information costs, thereby driving a wedge 
between the cost of external and internal finance. Therefore, the investment decisions of 
firms operating in such environments are sensitive to the availability of internal funds 
because they possess a cost advantage over external funds.  
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In order to overcome such information-related capital market imperfections; several 
economies have initiated financial market reforms in last two decades. At the firm level, the 
main objective of these reforms was to increase the supply and improve the allocation of 
funds for investment. In academia these reforms have spurred an interest in the effects of 
financial reforms at both firm and country level. Though intense empirical analysis at the 
macroeconomic level has undertaken but empirical work using microeconomic data is still 
scarce and no professional consensus on the net benefits of financial reforms has achieved. 
The existing studies at firm level offer mixed results. Studies have shown that financial 
reforms can be destabilizing, since it leads to excessive lending through credit expansion 
programs (Aghion et al. 2004). Moreover, empirical work examining the impact of reforms 
on firm’s foreign investment that is a foremost driver of current economic growth of 
emerging economies is virtually non-existent. Clearly, there is a need to analyse the targeted 
benefits of financial reforms on overall investment in general and foreign investment in 
particular.   
1.2.  Aims and objectives 
Emerging economies have experienced extraordinary growth in the past twenty years. Since 
the economic reforms initiated in the start of 1990, leading emerging economies, India and 
China, have achieved an average of nearly double digit growth rates in the last two decades. 
As part of the process to mitigate the imperfections in financial market, these economies 
underwent significant measures in liberalizing their financial sector. These reforms have 
encompassed a large number of areas including; removing the barriers to entry in the banking 
sector to promote finance penetration in the market, improving the bank’s screening 
capabilities to mitigate information asymmetry issues, dismantling the credit controls and 
development of security and financial markets to reduce the cost of external financing.  
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Although the main objective of such financial reforms has been to enhance the supply of 
funds through reducing the cost of external finance and mitigate the constraints on the supply 
of funds for both domestic and foreign investment, however, the consequences of such 
reforms on the ease of finance to firm investment is not well established. Therefore, the aim 
of this study is to investigate whether the financial reforms have reduced the financial 
constraints to firm investment decision through better allocation of funds and foreign listing. 
In particular, study examines the impact of financial reforms on firm domestic as well as 
foreign investment in Indian and Chinese market.  
In this dissertation, the approach that is followed differs from existing related studies in two 
perspectives. First, Euler investment model is developed while considering the theoretical 
motivations and the institutional factors of both economies. Second, the model is tested with 
the foreign as well as domestic investment of 501 non-financial large multinational Indian 
and Chinese firms for the period 2001-2009.  
1.3.  Structure of the thesis 
In chapter 2, the literature review on financial constraints and investment as a background of 
the empirical study of this thesis is presented. First, the concept of capital market 
imperfection is explained. It is follow by the theory of financing hierarchy. The impacts of 
business group affiliation and state-ownership are discussed in the following section. Next, 
the nexus between investment and financial constraints is presented. Finally, the financial 
constraints to foreign investments are discussed in the last section.     
Chapter 3 discusses the empirical methodology and dataset of the thesis. First, 
methodological framework is developed. Next, econometric issues in estimation are 
presented. The latter half of this chapter discusses the variables and the respective definitions 
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that this research employs. It explains how the dataset is built through presenting the sample 
selection criterions.  
Chapter 4 attempts to answer the main question of the research. In particular, first, it tests and 
discusses the impact of financial reforms on financial constraints to firm overall investment 
decision then domestic and foreign investment decision. Finally, chapter 5 concludes the 
thesis by providing the summary of the findings of the thesis. Moreover, some thoughts of 




Chapter 2: Literature Review of Financial Constraints and Investment 
2.1. Introduction 
The current chapter presents a comprehensive theoretical background and critically evaluates 
the extent of the empirical literature over the financial constraints and investment themes. 
Chapter begins with the model inspired by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and subsequent 
corporate income tax model Modigliani and Miller (1963) and personal income tax model 
Miller (1977). The later part of this section discusses the impact of financial reforms on firm 
financial constraints. This is followed by the foundation theory of financial hierarchy in 
section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines the impact of business group affiliation and state-ownership 
on corporate access to external finance. Section 2.5 discusses the studies using firm-level data 
to investigate the relationship between financial constraints and investment. Finally, section 
2.6 sets up some conclusions.      
2.2. Capital market imperfection 
The modern finance theories originating from the firm’s market value maximization principle 
embodies in the initial proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Under this proposition, a 
firm’s financial policy is irrelevant to its value. Specifically, it asserts that cost of capital and 
hence value of the firm is irrelevant of its choice of finance. In this case internal finance is 
considered as perfect substitute of external finance. Since firm in a perfect world of 
Modigliani and Miller (MM henceforth) operates without financial frictions, which means 
there does not involve transaction cost, taxes, and imperfect information; therefore, value of 
levered firm is equal to the value of un-levered firm.  
At the start though, MM initial proposition was considered for a firm’s debt-equity choices 
but the applications of proposition have since the expanded to firm’s all financial policies. 
Five years after instituting this irrelevance proposition, MM (1963) incorporated the 
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importance of taxes for the irrelevance of debt-equity choice. The results immensely overturn 
the claims of the earlier prediction. On this account they recognise the corporate tax 
advantages of debt to their model of corporate valuation, under which the value of the levered 
firm becomes sensitive to capital structure. Accordingly, value of firm will be at its maximum 
level with 100 percent utilization of debt. At this point, the discussion on the theoretical 
predictions of capital structure is either irrelevant when the market is perfect (MM, 1958), or 
set at its maximum prediction with the inclusion of corporate income tax in the otherwise 
perfect market (MM, 1963). However, neither proposition reflects the objective reality of the 
world. In fact, the second proposition raised the further provocative investigation- whether 
firm that issues equity leaves return their money in the form of unnecessary corporate income 
tax payments?  
Fourteen years later, Miller (1977) resolved this issue by adding personal taxes to the existing 
corporate tax correction valuation model. The crux of the argument is that with personal taxes 
there is no corporate advantage to leverage; so, interest tax gains on debt have little or no 
value for most firms. Under this prediction, higher taxes on interest payments than on 
dividends eliminate the debt associated advantage to the firm. After incorporating corporate 
and personal taxes, debt were cheaper than equity on a risk adjusted basis, firm would switch 
into debt and thus would try to stick with it up to the point where it ceased to be cheaper.  
These controversial propositions have stimulated researchers to keep adding real world’s 
elements in quest of how theoretical predictions change accordingly. Issues such as financial 
distress costs, transaction costs, agency issues and taxes are related to the elements of real 
world which have effect on firm investment. Subsequent theoretical work, thus, concentrate 
on these factors associated with market imperfections and their impacts on the firm 
investment. Importantly, contemporary research work has appeal to the problem of 
asymmetric information that rests in the centre of market imperfection. 
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Firm managers or insiders are assumed to have more information about operations and future 
prospects than outside investors, which creates the problem of information asymmetry.  
Information asymmetry between insiders of the firm and less-informed outsiders is a vital 
element of the real world which was missing in the underlying assumptions of the MM first 
proposition. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that superior information of insiders may 
resulted in to moral hazard problem in which managers can use funds on excessively risky 
projects. In order to compensate this potential risk, lender demands a premium for the debt 
and most likely use covenants to limit the fund utilization in specific projects. To certain 
extreme, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) predict that owing to information asymmetries lender 
cannot discriminate between good and bad borrower which lead to credit rationing in the 
credit market.  
Despite the fact that studies are providing various implications of information asymmetric 
problem, the basic underlying assumption is that internal funds are no longer substitute for 
external finance because of cost wedge between these two sources. This gap is positively 
associated with the degree of market imperfection which leads to an information cost (Harris 
et al., 1994). Firms with higher information asymmetry tend to face higher cost for external 
finance than firms with low level of information asymmetry. Thus, it is reasonable to believe 
that capital markets are imperfect, and MM propositions no longer stands.  
Though the issue of financial constraints concerns all markets around the globe but is more 
pertinent to developing countries. Therefore, in order to overcome market financial frictions, 
since the beginning of 90’s several developing countries have initiated financial reforms 
process. The financial reforms process has been characterised by greater scope granted to 
market forces in the determination of interest rates and the supply of credit (Galindo et al., 
2007).  Various reforms policies, such as, improving the bank’s screening capabilities to 
mitigate information asymmetry issues in the capital market, development of security and 
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financial markets to reduce the cost of external financing, and removing the barriers to entry 
in the banking sector to promote finance penetration in the market,  were introduced in this 
regard. Moreover, removal of credit ceiling and administrative controls on interest rate; and 
scaling down of credit programs were also found to be vital elements of the reforms (Laeven, 
2003). 
There is some international evidence of positive effects of reforms on firm financial 
constraints, however overall results are ambiguous. On the one hand, it is thought that 
financial reforms generate efficiency gains through increased financial intermediation by the 
formal financial sector. Owing to economies of scale in information gathering and 
monitoring, banks and financial institutes are expected to allocate investment funds at 
reduced cost (Laeven, 2003). On the other hand, it has seen that financial liberalization has 
failed to achieve the expected outcomes, because it accompanies a general rise in interest rate 
which raises the cost of capital; and elimination of subsidized credit programs which increase 
the financial constraints of substantial class of borrowers (Gertler and Rose, 1994).  
From the empirical standpoint, there are abundant empirical studies discussing financial 
reforms efficiency for the allocation of funds. In a cross-country analysis, Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000); and Henry (2000) find reduction in cost of capital after capital market 
liberalization in emerging markets. Wurgler (2000) also finds that rate at which resources are 
allocated to firms in productive industries depends on the development of financial system. 
He observes that informationally efficient secondary market prices, firm private ownership, 
and minority investor’s right are associated with better capital allocation. Harris et al., (1994) 
report favourable effects of financial reforms on relocation of domestic credit, resulting in 
improved firm investment. They further observe this effect on firm size categories and report 
that capital relocation is more centred to smaller firms, while large firms are able to substitute 
expensive domestic finance with cheaper foreign finance which helped to release some 
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domestic credit to financial deprived firms. Fisman and Love (2003) estimated the financial 
development and growth relationship for 37 industries in 42 countries, during the period 1980 
to 1990. After measuring the level of development as domestic credit provided by private 
sector banking industries, it is suggested that financial markets playing an important role in 
allowing firms to take advantage of global growth opportunities. They further observe that 
firms in industries that depend more on trade credit exhibit higher rates of growth in 
economies with weaker financial institutions and legal systems.  
Several studies have recently examined the issue of outcomes of financial reforms in a single 
emerging country context and found the mixed results. Gallego and Loayza (2000) suggest 
that reforms eased the financial constraints during the period of deregulation for Chilean 
firms. Investigating the impact of liberalization in Indonesian economy, Harris et al., (1994) 
find that reform has increased the borrowing costs affecting the investment to liquidity. 
Similar results are also obtained by Siregar (1992) for Indonesian establishments. He 
observes an increase in the flow of funds to more efficient firms after liberalization. Ghosh 
(2006) investigates the impact of financial liberalization on firm’s investment behaviour in 
Indian market. Using Panel data of over 1000 firms for the period 1995 to 2004, he finds that 
financial liberalization improves the access of external finance to financially constrained 
firms. This ease was more pronounced for small firms. In the similar country study, Bhaduri 
(2005) reveals contradictory evidence on the impact of financial linearization. He shows that 
small and young firms experience an increase in financial constraints in post liberalization 
period.  
Using dataset of 3199 Mexican manufacturing establishments, from 1984-1994, Gelos and 
Werner (2002) report that financial reforms in Mexico have only benefited to small firms in 
easing financial constraints. Their results show that financial reforms could not translate into 
a reduction in the premium of the cost of external finance but rather into an increase in the 
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number of firms that were potentially eligible for debt. They attribute these findings to poor 
evaluation system of banks and collateral based lending strategies. Contrary to this finding, 
Jaramillo et al., (1997) report that financial reforms in Ecuadorian market do not have had 
any effect on the severity of financial constraints to small firm investment. The continuing 
presence of informational imperfections, inefficient resource allocation to promote cheap 
credit for small firms following reforms is part of explanation.  
Laeven (2002) examines the impact of change in government policy of the financial 
constraints of different types of Korean firms. Using data on 198 Korean firms for the period 
1991 to 1997, he finds that change in policy brought positive effects for SMEs in the sense 
that it has reduced financing constraints to them. In a similar study, Kong (1998) uses data on 
171 listed manufacturing firms for the period 1981-1989 and tries to assess financing 
constraints. He observes that investment-cash flow sensitivity is lower for non-chaebol firms 
after the opening of the capital market in 1986. On the other hand, Borensztein and Lee 
(1999) provide evidence of inefficient credit allocation after credit market opening in Korea 
and show that credit was allocated preferentially to the sectors with the worst economic 
performances.  
Although these studies provide useful insights on some of the consequences of financial 
development or of financial reform in different countries, but these empirical findings to date 
about the effects of financial reforms on financing constraints in developing countries has 
been inconclusive. Therefore, whether financial reforms relax financial constraints faced by 
firms in obtaining external funds is ultimately an empirical question.  
2.3. Theory of financial hierarchy 
Resting on the notion of imperfect capital market, a firm with information asymmetric 
problem may only be able to access external finance on less favourable terms. Consequently, 
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firm has an advantage in using internal finance over external funds. This is the main theme of 
“financing hierarchy theory” or “pecking order theory”. According to pecking order rule firm 
follows the hierarchy while financing the investment. The idea of financing hierarchy 
originates from the pioneering work of Donaldson (1961), but Mayers and Majluf (1984) 
present a clear theoretical rationale on the issue. They argue that if firm finances new 
investment by issuing underpriced equity, wealth would be transferred from existing 
shareholders to new investors. Therefore, managers tend to reject the investment regardless of 
its positive NPV. Here, Mayers and Majluf suggest that this situation can be avoided if source 
of finance are switched to financial sources which are less susceptible to underinvestment, 
such as retained earnings or debt. It can be inferred that in such circumstances, internal funds 
and debt would be preferred to equity. 
There are formally four predictions about firm financing behaviour of this pecking order 
theory (Mayers and Majluf, 1984). First, dividend is considered as “sticky” and firms adjust 
their target dividend payout ratios to their investment opportunities. Second, firm prefer 
internal finance over external finance. Third, if firm must obtain external capital, firm will 
resort to the security and eventually progressing through risky finance. They have to start 
with debt, then hybrid securities and finally equity will be the last resort. 
This hierarchy or strict ordering can be explained mainly by the cost associated with each 
financing source which is related to the magnitude of information asymmetry. From the 
investor’s point of view, internal capital generally poses no information asymmetry problems. 
The issuance of debt can cause minor frictions which appear as conflict between managers 
and debt holders, while the issuance of equity is subject to serious information frictions, and 
can appears as conflict between debt holders and equityholders.  
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The noteworthy aspect of this theory is the inclusion of cost of external finance in corporate 
financing choice. Further, it puts forward a motive for holding cash since external sources 
should be avoided and there is no optimal level of cash holdings because it is assumed that 
there is no optimal level of debt. Cash balances are simply the outcome of the financing 
choices of firm as proposed by Myers and Majluf’s (1984) hierarchical model. Therefore, 
when firm’s resources are adequate and surpass the amount required for investment, the firm 
will pay dividend, otherwise retain cash (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003).  
In essence, there are three seminal documented views supporting the financing hierarchy. The 
first view, proposed by Donaldson (1961), suggests that strict hierarchy of financial sources 
is the way of management to evade market monitoring. The second view by Myers (1984) 
claims that financing hierarchy is the device to minimise transaction costs of financial 
sources. The third view initiated by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that 
financing hierarchy is aimed to reduce information asymmetry between firms and outside 
investors. The notion of information asymmetry is in line with the signalling argument 
forwarded by Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). 
From the financial reforms perspective, as the reforms are thought to reduce the 
imperfections in credit market, resulting in a reduction in the cost of formal finance and an 
increase in the level supply of credit. The availability of credit from the market in reformed 
market enables firms to utilize more external credit and be less dependent on internal capital. 
Using a firm level sample of 40 countries, Love (2003) finds that firms’ dependence on 
internal capital is lower in economies equipped with well-developed financial system. He 
concludes that financial development mitigates the financial constraints; thereby firms have 
access to credit market. Moreover, Leaven (2003) report that reduction in financing 
constraints following reforms is likely to have more effect for small firms. He finds that, in a 
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sample of 13 developing economies for the period 1988 to 1998, dependence on internal 
capital following the banking sector deregulation significantly decreased for small firms. 
In a cross-country study of 43 countries during the period between 1980 and 1990, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) investigate how external finance affects growth of firm and ultimately 
industry. They report that firms in industries (i.e. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals) that are 
technologically more dependent on external finance for their investment grow considerably 
faster following the liberalization. Further, they decompose the growth pattern into new and 
old establishments. As young firms are more likely depend more on external finance than old 
firms, so the growth of the young establishments is more sensitive to financial development. 
In a closer study, Gupta and Yuan (2009) examine the effects of stock market liberalization 
on cost of external finance by using a sample of 31 countries between 1981 and 1998. Their 
finding strengthens the previous results (Fisman and Love, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 1998) 
that liberalization promotes economic growth by lowering the cost of external finance and 
this effect is more pronounced in industries that are more dependent on external financing. 
On the other hand, they contradict with Rajan and Zingales (1998) and offer evidence that 
new firms are likely to be more financially constrained and depends more on internal capital 
following the liberalization. They contributed this result to the institutional and regulatory 
level entry barriers in countries that allocate capital less efficiently. 
2.4.  Business group affiliation and state-ownership 
As it is discussed earlier, the inefficient financial system makes it more onerous for firms to 
access formal finance (La Porta et al., 1997). In an environment where institutional efforts to 
mitigate such market frictions are not sufficient, firms are often organized into business 
groups, which become a collection of independent firms from various industries that are 
connected either formally or informally. Prior research on groups has discussed their role in 
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risk sharing among group member firms (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005) and in facilitating 
member firms overcome financial impediments to external finance (Hoshi et al., 1991).    
The role of business group in mitigating capital market imperfections is initially studied by 
Leff (1976). In his research he shows that group structure offers a system for pooling and 
distributing resources among the member firms. Moreover, the diversification increases the 
flow of information within the group and thereby reduces the risk. Leff further argues that 
group structure provides an internal capital market that mobilises the available resources to 
group. Owing to these characteristics, business groups maintain superior access to external 
resources. This access is obtained mainly through holding large size of corporate shares that 
entitle them to scoop large proportion of firm profits which provide them monopolistic power 
within the market. Therefore according to Leff the business groups perform the function of a 
capital market for member firms. This view is regarded as market failure theory. The 
application of business group is more prevalent in developing countries where capital market 
is distorted and firms are unable to overcome the market frictions by themselves.  
The benefits from diversification within business groups is also the subject of Khanna and 
Palepu (2000), who used Chile as empirical setting and observed the structure and financial 
policies of groups affiliates over the period 1988 to 1996. Specifically, their research work 
seeks to distinguish between benefits that are due to affiliation with a diversified group, and 
benefits from group affiliation that is non-diversification related. Results show that benefits 
related to diversifications to group affiliates might be due to the social links between member 
firms. Such links decrease transaction costs by encouraging information distribution amongst 
group firms, and by offering cost effective strategies for resolving disputes and contracting 
problems. Similarly, Khanna and Yafeh (2005) report that Indian business groups use intra-
group loans to smooth liquidity among the member firms and their investment is less 
constrained to the availability of external finance.  
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The inability of financial institutions to overcome the financial markets impediments leads 
firms to prefer having state-ownership. State-owned firms are typically characterized by soft 
budget constraints, as the main function of these firms is not to maximize profit, but rather to 
maintain the social stability (Guariglia, 2008). In particularly, as mentioned in Bai et al. 
(2006), the main task of these firms is to maintain the employment of surplus workers and to 
guarantee their welfare. The government has therefore an incentive to keep these firms alive. 
To do so, government provides them with large amount of credit. Therefore, market frictions 
generating financial constraints are not the problem of these firms. 
State-owned firms are considered as less risky than their private counterparts in the credit 
market. In the event of SOEs failing to repay their loan, lending institutions believe that the 
government will bail them out, and it is typically politically acceptable to lend to SOEs. In 
addition, it is more cost effective for lenders to give loan to SOEs than to private firms. 
Empirical evidence of this phenomenon is echoed in Dollar and Wei (2007), who report that 
state-owned firms have significantly lower returns to capital than private firms in Chinese 
capital market, indicating that favourable treatment of state-owned firms in the credit market. 
Similarly, Liu and Siu (2006) provide evidence that the cost of capital for state-owned firms 
is lower than for private firms in China.  
In the similar vein, Manova et al., (2009) show that state-owned firms in China are more 
immune to credit constraints since they enjoy preferential treatment and substantially easier 
access to financing, particularly from state-owned banks. Therefore, state-owned firms have 
an advantage over domestic firms in overcoming binding credit constraints on their 
investment, which will manifest in firms’ investments. Moreover, this advantage is found 
more pronounced in sectors characterized by particularly high upfront costs and limited 
tangible assets.   
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Taken together, business group affiliation and state-ownership facilitate firms in mitigating 
financial constraints by providing preferential access to external financial resources. 
Graphically, the impact of group affiliation and state-ownership is represented in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Impact of group affiliation or state-ownership on access of external finance 
 
Empirically, it is of great importance to test this conjecture that firms belonging to a 
corporate group or having state-ownership are less subject to financial constraints in the 
credit market than standalone or private firms. 
2.5. Empirical evidences on financial constraints and investment relationship 
A firm is considered as financially constrained if the cost or availability of external finance 
precludes the firm from making an investment it would have chosen to make had internal 
funds been available (Cleary, 1999). Since the seminal work of Fazzari et al., (1988), a large 
and growing body of literature aims to provide evidence of financial constraints a might face 
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in the capital market. Most studies rely on the sensitivity of internal funds (mainly, retained 
earnings) to the investment spending as a mechanism to measure the severity of financial 
constraints.  
In order to measure the financial constraints in a panel of 422 large U.S manufacturing firms 
over the 1970 to 1984 time period, Fazzari et al., (1988) empirically test the relationship 
between investment spending and internal funds. They argue that firms with higher retention 
ratios face higher informational asymmetry problems and are more likely to be liquidity 
constrained. They classified the sample using a priori classification of firm’s financing 
constraints, such as dividend pay-out ratio, and compare the investment-cash flow 
sensitivities of these sub-samples. They report that sub-sample classified as financially 
constrained (one having low dividend pay-out ratio) possess higher investment-liquidity 
sensitivity. Higher sensitivity for the samples of a priori more constrained classified firms is 
interpreted as evidence of tighter financing constraints. Following their work, now it has 
become a standard research methodology to investigate the disparity in sensitivities of 
investment to cash flow between a priori segmented firms.  
Subsequent studies have confirmed the central result of Fazzari et al. by showing that the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for firms that have a high ‘susceptibility’ to capital 
market imperfections. Hoshi et al. (1991) find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow 
among 24 Japanese manufacturing firms that are not members of a keiretsu (having no bank 
relationship) than that of 121 firms that are members of a keiretsu (bank-group affiliated) and 
are presumed to be less financially constrained. Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) study 99 
NYSE-listed and 21 over-the-counter firms over the 1977 to 1983 period and conclude that 
investment-liquidity sensitivity is higher for firms that are young, whose stocks are traded 
over-the-counter, and that exhibit insider trading behaviour consistent with privately held 
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information. Schaller (1993) examines 212 Canadian firms during the 1973 to 1986 period. 
He reports that investment for young and independent firms is more sensitive to cash flow.    
Using a panel of small U.S firms for the period 1980-1992, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) 
find that though these firms experience higher growth rate but cash flow sensitivity to their 
investment is higher which means these firms are more financial constrained. Similar results 
are reported on a sample of Italian firms in Becchetti and Trovato (2002); and Fagiolo and 
Luzzi (2006). In particular, they find that availability of external finance negatively affects to 
the growth of Italian small firms and exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Whited 
(1992); and Bond and Meghir (1994) using a sample of 325 U.S manufacturing firms and 
unbalanced panel of 626 U.K firm, respectively, confirm the Fazarri et al. result and find the 
financial constraints to be particularly binding for the constrained groups of firms.   
On the other hand, several studies question the validity of this interpretation. Importantly, 
work done by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) fuelled this debate. They challenge the generality 
of conclusions achieved by Fazzari et al., and classify firms based on quantitative and 
qualitative information retrieved from firm annual reports. They classified firms as 
financially constrained if a firm is in violation of debt covenants, renegotiating debt 
payments, or forced to reduce investment because of liquidity issues. Contrary to previous 
findings, they show that investment decision of firms having most information asymmetry 
exhibit least sensitivity to cash flow. That is interpreted as investments of least financial 
constrained firms are the most sensitive to the cash flow. This contradictory result is also 
supported by several empirical studies. For example, Cleary (1999) provides strong support 
for results in Kaplan and Zingales by using diversified sample of large 1,317 U.S firms and 
reports that more creditworthy firms exhibit greater investment-cash flow sensitivity than 
those classified as less creditworthy.  Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) provided the similar 
evidence that large U.S firms with higher pay-out ratios exhibit higher investment-cash flow 
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sensitivity. Similarly, Kadapakkam et al., (1998) support this notion by providing evidence 
from six OECD countries, over the period of nine years, that larger firms are more cash flow 
sensitive than their small counterparts. Cleary (1999) reports higher cash flow sensitivity for 
firms with stronger financial positions are than those that are less credit creditworthy in the 
market. In the similar vein, Audretsch and Elston (2002) show that medium sized German 
firms are financial constrained than either the small or the large firms.  
In response to this growing controversy, few studies; namely, Almeida et al. (2004) and 
Khurana et al. (2006) tried to implement a new metric; cash- cash flow sensitivity rather 
investment-cash flow sensitivity to measure financial constraints. The interpretation remained 
similar; cash-cash flow sensitivity would be higher for financially constrained firms. Almeida 
et al. argue that using financial variable rather a real variable makes this measure less 
susceptible to uncontrollable variables, i.e. unknown future growth opportunities. Besides 
efforts inserted by these authors to find new metric, the investment-cash flow measure is still 
widely accepted measure for measuring financial constraints in literature. As Guariglia 
(2008) suggests that different conclusions reached by these two strands may actually be due 
to different measurements of financial constraints used but their intuition is interlink.  
2.6.  Foreign investment 
In recent years, as a result of global integration, there has been a remarkable increase in the 
number of corporations operating outside their country of origin. Their foreign business 
activities ranges from simple export to more complicated decisions including setting up 
wholly owned subsidiaries, licensing, franchising and joint venture. These multinationals face 
many different risks as the principle hazards that may affect most in the case of foreign 
investment. These risks relates to economic, legal, currency and political aspects of 
destination country (Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003).  
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Existing theories of multinational foreign investment and cross-border operations have 
developed independently from the literature on corporate domestic investment, but essentially 
coincide in terms of the firm’s cost and availability of funding for investment (Horstmann 
and   Markusen, 1989; Aguiar and Gopniath, 2005). In this perspective, the possible effects of 
availability of finance or cost of finance is somewhat similar on both domestic and 
investment finance. However, the likelihood of accessing additional channels of external 
finance and/or cheaper finance is higher for multinational firms to undertake foreign 
investments. For instance, Froot and Stein (1991) discuss the possibility of cheap finance 
channel through source-country overvaluation or target-country undervaluation for foreign 
investment. Somehow similarly, De Santis et al. (2004) and Klein et al. (2002) test the stock 
market valuations in domestic and foreign market as a determinant of corporate foreign 
investment.  
Literature has reported the contradictory effect of foreign nature of investment on cost of 
capital. Robbins and Stobaugh (1973) suggest that firms with foreign investments are able to 
exploit market imperfection and reduce the cost of capital for international activities. For 
instance, firms can take advantage of distortions in host country interest rates, avoid host 
country credit restrictions, and obtain lower cost of debt because of differing risk premiums 
in various host country markets. Similarly, Shapiro (1978) and Hughes et al., (1975) report 
the negative relation between firm’s foreign investment and cost of capital but their 
arguments rest on the benefits of diversification in reducing risks. The diversification of 
assets offers firms lower earnings volatility and reduces the probability of bankruptcy that in 
turn leads to a lower cost of capital for them. 
On the other hand, opposite impact of foreign investment on cost of capital is posited by 
Solnik (1974). He rests his argument on the higher degree of risk associated with foreign 
investment. Similarly, Reeb et al. (1998) report that firms that engage in foreign investment 
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are more exposed to foreign exchange risk that in turn causes greater variance in the return of 
domestic currency. Both the political and foreign exchange risks leads to higher probability 
of financial distress, thereby, cost of capital increases. In addition to such risks, Armstrong 
and Riddick (2000) posit that foreign investments possess greater stakeholder heterogeneity 
and information asymmetry. The information discrepancies coupled with legal and regulatory 
differences increase the cost of financial distress; thereby cost of capital is higher for such 
firms. Another related argument for higher cost of capital for foreign investing firms is the 
agency costs. As Lee and Kwok (1988) note that foreign investments have greater agency 
costs than purely domestic projects since it is hard for investors to monitor foreign business 
activities. Empirical studies like Hughes et al. (1975) and Fatemi (1984) indicate that foreign 
investments have lower systematic risk than domestic investments that leads to lower cost of 
capital. Contrarily, Reeb et al., (1998) indicate that U.S. firms suffer higher cost of capital 
than their local peers. However, Brewer (1981) does not provide any evidence for the 
relationship between destination of investment and cost of capital. Taken together, available 
empirical studies present a mixed picture of the impact that foreign investment have on cost 
of capital.   
In the absence of efficient and internationally integrated financial markets where any firm can 
source its funding anywhere regardless of country of residence, firms may adopt the 
opportunistic behaviour and undertake foreign investment in response to financial market 
imperfections. However, on the other hand, firms may also choose to behave in proactive 
way where firm can stay in its home market, or invest in foreign markets to internationalize 
its cost of capital and reap the benefits of the economies of scale (Forssback and Oxelheim, 
2011). The recent waves of financial reforms around the globe, in fact, intend to alter the 
firm’s reactive financial strategy to proactive financial strategy by improving the credit 
supply for foreign investment. The financial reforms in markets with financial discrepancies 
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facilitate firms to increase the extent of foreign investment by not only increasing the supply 
of external funds but also by encouraging firms to list in foreign markets. The positive affect 
of foreign listing on foreign investment is reported in the study of Modén and Oxelheim 
(1997) and Tolmunen and Torstila (2005). They find that European foreign listed firms are 
more likely to make foreign investment in US.  Therefore according to main hypothesis of 
this study it is expected to find the positive effect of foreign listing, as an outcome of 
financial reforms, on the foreign investment.  
2.7.  Conclusion 
The theory of firm investment has been reviewed in this chapter as it has developed since 
1958 when Modigliani and Miller (1958) first argued that financial policy is irrelevant to the 
value of firm. Since then, this view has been amended and disputed by richer theoretical and 
empirical studies to relax underlying assumptions. 
An important element that has been appended to the MM’s (1958) proposition of irrelevancy 
is information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf instigated this discussion). Important dimension 
of this extension is the inclusion of cost of information asymmetry that exist between insider 
and outsider of firm, which creates a wedge between the cost of external and internal finance. 
Therefore, according to this theory firm should follow a financing hierarchy, exhibit a 
preference towards internal funds over funds generated externally, and whenever external 
funds are required, firms would seek for the cheaper source first.  
This notion is initially tested by Fazzari et al., (1988) and a number of subsequent empirical 
studies provide strong support for the existence of this financing hierarchy, which is most 
prevalent among firms that have been identified as facing a high level of financial constraints. 
These studies categorize firms according to characteristics; such as size, age, group 
membership, dividend payout ratio or debt ratings, that are designed to measure the level of 
23 
 
information asymmetry faced by firms in the capital market. Studies rely on the sensitivity of 
internal funds to the investment spending as a mechanism to measure the severity of financial 
constraints. The results suggest that investment decisions of firms that are more financially 
constrained are more sensitive to the availability of internal funds than those of less 
constrained firms.  
To overcome capital market imperfections several economies have underwent financial 
market reforms in last two decades. There is evidence that for some developing countries 
financial reforms has led to a relaxation of constraints for those firms that had restricted 
access to finance in the pre-reform period. However, on the other side, it is argued that 
reforms distort the allocation of credit. In light of diverse findings regarding the impact of 
financial reforms, albeit it can be concluded that financial reforms are largely but not entirely, 
successful in helping firms to access external finance. Empirical evidences within individual 
countries and for cross-countries are still too weak to draw definitive conclusions regarding 
the impact of these financial reforms. In addition, these studies do not address directly and 
comprehensively the question of whether financial reform has any effect on firm’s 
investment. To gain more insight into this important question of whether financial market 
reforms benefits developing countries, there is need to use panel data at the firm level to 






Chapter 3: Empirical methodology and data description 
 
This chapter starts with the formulation of empirical framework of this research. It follows 
with the data description of used variables in the analysis. 
3.1.  Jorgenson’s (1963) model and Euler equation model 
Several models of investment behaviour have been applied to flows of direct investment. One 
of the most influential models is Jorgenson’s (1963) neoclassical model, where investment is 
described as a process of optimal capital stock adjustment. Jorgenson model identifies 
investment as adjustment to or toward the capital stock that will be optimal for a firm or 
industry (Caves, 1996). The level of capital stock depends on the required or optimal output 
level, and the price of output is based on cost of capital which comprised of interest and 
depreciation rates. The optimal capital stock is derived through maximization of discounted 
profit flows over an infinite time horizon. Jorgenson assumes that capital-labour ratios adapt 
to relative factor price changes, where the relative factor price of capital is measured as the 
user or rental cost of capital. At the end of the optimization problem in the model, the main 
determinants of investment emerge as the user cost of capital (essentially the relative cost of 
capital inputs) and output. In this neoclassical approach, policy prescriptions centre on 
allowing the market to operate freely and efficiently by promoting the flexibility of prices.  
According to Chrinko (1993), given that the production function has a constant elasticity (σ) 
of substitution between capital and variable inputs, the relation between the desired stock of 
capital, the level  of output, and the  user cost (or rental price) of capital (Ct) can be achieved 
as follows:  
  
       




     
 
               
    
                                                                                                             
where α is the distribution parameter, pt
I
 is purchase price of new capital (relative to the price 
of output), rt is the real financial cost of capital net of taxes, δ is the geometric rate of capital 
depreciation, mt is the rate of the investment tax credit, zt is the discounted value of tax 
depreciation allowances, and tt is the rate of business income taxation. Equation (1) exhibits 
the dependence of the desired capital stock on a quantity variable (Yt) and a set of price 
variables combines in user cost.   
Net investment (It
n
) is determined by a distributed lag on new orders, which equal in a given 
period the change in the desired capital stock. It can be represented as:  
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where β indicates the delivery lag distribution extending for J+1 periods. Replacement 
investment (It
r
) is proportional to the capital stock available at the beginning of the period and 
in contrast to It
n
, adjusts instantly. Mathematically, replacement investment can be expressed 
as: 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Combining equations (2), (3), and (4) and including a stochastic error (εt), we obtain the 
standard Jorgenson model of investment,  
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This typical Jorgenson’s investment model assumes that capital stock adjustment is 
instantaneous, adjustment costs are zero, and investment decisions are completely reversible. 
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This means that investors do not have to look to the future in Jorgenson’s world because they 
can respond quickly and effectively when the time comes; their expectations are essentially 
static. The sceptics have frequently questioned the consistency of this theoretical model by 
resting their arguments on following four issues. First, the profit maximization firm selects 
the level of capital stock and output level simultaneously. The model presented above in 
equation (5) does not recognise this fact. Second, the development of (5) was based on an 
inharmonious treatment of delivery lags. The optimal capital stock in equation (2) was 
derived under the assumption that delivery of capital goods was immediate, but the net 
investment equation (3) was based on a delivery lag distribution. Under such circumstances, 
the investment generated in equation (5) is not optimal. Third, Kt
*
 in equation is not well 
defined under the condition when production technology produces constant returns. Fourth, 
the prices, quantities, and autonomous shocks as determinants of investment spending are 
sensitive to estimation.   
Following widespread criticism, ad hoc lags are introduced into later specifications of 
Jorgensonian models to capture expectations. However, the introduction of these 
specifications converts the Jorgensonian model from a neoclassical investment model to a 
modified accelerator model (Chrinko, 1993).  
Though the neoclassical model has proved popular in studies investigating statistically 
foreign investment decision, however its foundation in pure competitive markets is limited. 
As Caves (1996) explains, the Jorgenson model does not apply to foreign investments which 
yield downward sloping demand curve. The subsequent empirical studies attempting to 
capture this future uncertainty more effectively are still not able to solve the problem of 
forecasting (Gezici, 2007). One attempt to solve the issue relating to unobservable expected 
variables is known as the Euler equation of investment and widely adopted in the financial 
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literature. Unlike the Jorgenson model, the Euler model incorporates the dynamic elements 
and expectation parameters that appear explicitly in the optimization problem.       
According to Love (2003), the main intuition of the Euler equation is like this: the marginal 
cost of investing today (given by the sum of adjustment costs and the price of investment 
goods) is equal to the discounted marginal cost of postponing investment until tomorrow. The 
latter is equal to the sum of the foregone marginal benefit of an extra unit of capital, plus the 
adjustment cost and the price of investment tomorrow. The Euler model implies that along 
the optimal capital accumulation path, the firm will be indifferent to an increase in capital 
today only if there is a decrease by an equivalent amount in the next period, thus leaving the 
capital stock unaffected from the next period onward.  
3.2. Structural models of firm investment based on the Euler equation 
This section describes a dynamic model of value optimization of a firm under an imperfect 
capital market, which closely follows the models in Correa (2008); Love (2003) and Laeven 
(2003)
1
. We begin by assuming that a firm maximizes its value by choosing investment and 
debt which is equal to the expected the expected discount value of dividends subject to the 
capital accumulation and external financial constraints.  
Let Vt be the value of a firm’s market value at time t, Kt the firm’s capital stock at time t, Bt 
the firm’s financial liabilities,  
 
 is productivity shock, It is investment expenditure, Dt is non-
negative dividend payment shareholder at time t. So, firm’s optimization problem is given as: 
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 Several authors derived investment model with market frictions in different ways, for instance, Forbes (2003); 





] is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t and β is 
the firm’s discount factor.  
The market value of a firm defined in equation (6) intrinsically depends on the amount of 
capital stock it posses and the dividend it pays to shareholder in the previous year. The value 
of capital stock comprises of investment and the discounted capital stock of last year while 
the second factor, dividend paid to shareholders, depends on the net profit earned in the last 
year. Formally these constraints can be expressed in the following three equations:   
    (     )                         (   (        ))                                     
                                                                                                                                               
Dt  0  (9) 
where, rt is the risk free rate of return,  (Kt,  t) is the restricted profit function (already 
maximized with respect to variable costs),  and C(It, Kt) is the convex adjustment cost 
function for investment.  
Equation (7) defines the dividend Dt paid to shareholders at period t as the difference between 
the profit generated in a given period t and the cost of investment. Financial frictions are 
introduced in the model by adding an external finance premium that is an increasing function 
of firm’s debt at time t, given by  (Bt, Kt,  t) and which influences the cost of investment. 
Specifically, the gross required rate of return on debt is (1+rt) (1+  (Bt, Kt,  t)) Bt, where rt is 
the risk free rate of return.
2
  Equation (8) represents the capital accumulation constraint which 
includes the rate of capital depreciation. Finally, we impose a non-negativity constraint on 
dividends in equation (9).    
 
                                                          
2
 The firm’s infinite horizon optimization problem is usually reduced to a two-period problem. At the beginning 
of the period the firm select how much capital it wants to install.    
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The two first-order conditions to the above maximization problem are: 
  
        
   
      [
      
    
 {(
     
     
)       (  (
     
     
))}]                                      
and 
   [ {(
      
    
)  (   
   
 (
  
   
     
     ))}]                                                                   
 
Equation (10) can be interpreted as the marginal cost of investing at time t being equal to the 
discounted marginal cost of investing one period later. The marginal cost of investment is 
represented by 
        
   
 and 
     
     
 is marginal product of capital (MPK). t represents the 
relative shadow cost of external finance in period t and t+1. The MPK is function of sales to 
capital ratio, following Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999), it is assumed that a production 
function has a Cobb-Douglas form which can be represented as MPKit= θi(Sit/Kit), where θ is 
capital share in the production function, and S is the firm sale.  
 
Since this first-order condition presented in equation (11) is not related to the Euler equation 
for investment, this paper follows Correa (2008) and Laeven (2003) and focus on the 
investment decision leaving the choice of debt implicit.  
 
The key parameter in equation (10) is the shadow cost of external finance is represented as t 
= (1+ λt+1/1+ λt) where, λt is the shadow cost of external funds, or a premium on outside 
finance. In perfect capital markets, where λt+1=λt=0 and t=1 for all t, the firm is never 
constrained.  In imperfect capital markets, the relative shadow cost of external finance over 
period t and t+1 is (1+ λt+1/1+ λt) where, λt is the shadow cost of external funds. On the other 
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hand, if the firm is financially constrained in period t+1, then we can infer that λt=0 and 
λt+1>0, and so t >1.  
 
In the case of financial reforms in emerging markets, we expect financial reforms to ease the 
credit constraint in the economy through increasing the flow of credit to firms.  Thus, the 
shadow price of capital in period t+1 (after reform) is likely to be zero, whereas in pre-
reforms period the firm bears a shadow cost due to the scarcity of capital. Therefore, ceteris 
paribus, the outcome of financial reforms are λt+1 <λt and λt+1=0, and t < 1.  However, with 
capital market imperfections, t depends on a vector of state variables and observable firm 
characteristics and so the stochastic discount term may be quite different for each firm. 
 
To arrive at the empirical model, equation (10) is parameterized and transformed as explained 
in the following subsection.  
 
3.3. Specifying the empirical equation 
 
The stochastic discount factor 1+ λt+1/1+ λt induced by financial constraints enters in the 
equation (10) in a multiplicative form. In empirical estimations, generally it is easier to 
estimate the financial constraints when they are additive. Therefore, the product of stochastic 




) in equation (10) is linearized using a first-order 
approximation around the means get the following improved form: 
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where Ψ includes all constant terms and assumed that E(t,t+1)  1 and E(MPK)  φ. 
 
To express the above expression in a closed-form form it is necessary to specify the 
adjustment cost function. So, following the standard assumption in the literature (Love, 
2003), linear homogeneity in investment and capital is assumed. Thus, the functional form is 
as: 
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where i is firm and vi is a firm specific effects. This equation includes the lagged term of 
investment to capital ratio to measure the persistence observed in the data.  
 
The important aspect of this estimation is the definition of the stochastic discount factor 
representing financial constraints Фt,t+s. The earlier related work has relied on ad hoc 
parameterizations using observed firm specific variables representing firm’s financial health 
to identify the effect of financing constraints on investment decisions. This study follows the 
similar pattern and uses the “stock of liquid assets”, namely the value of cash and 
equivalents, and divide it by the capital stock to parameterize Фi;t,t+s as: 
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A large literature (i.e. Khanna and Palepu, 1997; and Khanna and Yafeh, 2005) suggests that 
stochastic discount factor is different for business group affiliated firms. They argue that 
business group acts as an intermediary between individual affiliated firm and imperfect 
capital market that result in reduced financial frictions. Similarly, studies (i.e. Cull et al., 
2009; and Poncet et al., 2010) provide evidence of the impact of state-ownership on the 
outside financing and show that cost of capital is substantially lower for state-owned firms 
than private firms. Therefore, to capture the impact of these firm-specific factors on financial 
constraints, business group affiliation BG and state-ownership SOE are interacted with the 
stochastic discount factor, and shown as: 
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A fairly large body of scholarly work emphasises that financial reforms can improve firm 
investment through increasing the supply of funds and facilitating firms to raise funds by 
listing in foreign markets
3
. Since, the main hypothesis of this study is that financial reforms 
reduce financial constraints to firm investment. We therefore, also interact the variables for 
credit supply and access to credit in foreign markets with discount factor. The augmented 
form of equation is as follows:   
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where YSR is a measure for supply for funds indicating years since reforms in a country j and 
FList  indicates firm’s foreign listing.  
                                                          
3




The interactive terms (CF/K)it, ((CF/K)*BG)it, ((CF/K)*SOE)it, ((CF/K)it*YSRj), 
((CF/K)*FList)it and MPKit are represented by a vector autoregressive process of order one. 
This makes it possible to express equations (12) and (16) as a linear function of the current 
value of these variables. After the required substitutions, linearization, and adding an error 
term, the empirical model is given by: 
 
    
    
      
      
      
   
       
      
   
       
      
          
       
      
           
       
      
        
  
       
      
             
      
      
   
      
      
                                             
 
where fi are firm fixed effects and dc denote country dummies capturing aggregate shocks 
differentiated by countries. The error term εit is orthogonal to any information available at the 
time when the investment decision is made.   
 
With respect to the coefficients in Equation (15), the main testable hypotheses of this study 
are formally stated as: 
 
 2 > 0,    3 < 0,   4 < 0                                                      (18)       
and the impact of financial reforms as tested as: 
 
 2 > 0,  5 < 0 and  6 < 0                                                   (19) 
 
That is, firm-level financial constraint decreases with the financial reforms as credit supply 




International finance literature distinguishes between foreign investments from domestic 
investments due to the different level of risk exposure associated with them (Desai et al., 
2007). The evidence indicates that the volatilities of investment returns vary substantially for 
domestic and foreign investment owing to information asymmetries and risk differences. This 
increased volatility of returns is higher for foreign investments and is also manifest in a 
greater likelihood of annual losses for foreign investments. These factors make lenders biased 
against foreign investments having less visibility and high risk. Therefore, it is considered 
that financial constraints in the credit market to foreign investment are higher than domestic 
investment.  
 
Following this argument, we divide our investment into domestic and foreign investments 
and expect that discount factor interacts differently with investmentcash flow sensitivity for 
domestic and foreign investment. Moreover, we expect to have magnitude of coefficients 
different for domestic and foreign investment. The estimation equations for domestic and 
foreign investments are follows: 
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3.4. Econometric issues in estimation 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equations (17) may yield unsatisfactory 
results, because dynamic investment models are likely to suffer from both endogeneity and 
heterogeneity problems (Bond, 2002). Since the error term captures a technology shock to the 
profit function, it may be correlated with explanatory variables such as sale and cash flow. 
The presence of lagged endogenous variables for investment will also bias the coefficient 
estimates for the OLS estimation.  
Since the model, as specified in central estimating equation (17), contains lagged dependent 
variable, endogeneity of regressor can be a potential problem (Arellano & Bond, 1991). More 
specifically, as Laeven (2002) reports that in dynamic investment models the presence of 
unobserved firm-fixed effects cause endogeneity problem. To eliminate unobserved firm-
fixed effects, and endogeneity of regressors, one can estimate the investment equation in 
first-difference. The generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation is widely used with 
lagged independent variables as instruments for this purpose to estimate the dynamic panel 
data models in first-difference.   
A necessary condition to run GMM estimation is to assure the validity of underlying 
assumptions on which it is based, namely, validity of instruments and error term should be 
serially uncorrelated from residuals. In order to check the validity of instruments, Sargan test 
of overidentifying restrictions is used to checks the overall validity of the instruments. 
Second, second order (AR-2) tests examine the hypothesis of serial uncorrelation of error 
term with regressor. The failure to reject the null hypotheses for AR-2 provides support to the 
model.   
The rational expectation error, εit is orthogonal to any information available at the time when 
the investment decision is made, which is the beginning of the year. Taking into account that 
36 
 
firms report their information at the end of the year, all information available to managers 
will be dated t-1. As a result, the orthogonality conditions for this model are given by E[εit | xt-
s] for s>1. I estimate the model by GMM with an optimal weighting matrix, using as 
instruments t-1 and t-2 lags of all the variables in the regression. The weighting matrix takes 
into account the panel structure of the data.  
Under the assumption that the error term is not serially correlated and the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous (or predetermined as commonly referred in GMM literature), 
the two stage moment conditions apply to the lagged dependent variable and the set of 
explanatory variables. The GMM estimator uses these moment conditions to estimate the 
parameters consistently and efficiently in two steps. 
Estimation work is carried out using Stata 11 and do file is provided in Appendix.  
3.5.  Dataset used in estimations 
The data used in this paper is taken from ORBIS, provided by the Bureau van Dijk (BvD). 
It’s a largest set of firm level data that provides the detailed financial accounts information as 
well as other detailed firm specific information for more than 650,000 firms. Our sample 
contains data on total 501 non-financial large firms having foreign subsidiaries from India 
and China. ORBIS defines very large companies as those with operating revenue of at least 
US $40 m or over 1000 employees. In particular, Indian 287 firms represent 57% of total 
sample and 214 Chinese firms represent 43% of total sample. We select large firms to test the 
aforementioned hypotheses because impact of financial reforms in terms of foreign listing is 
most likely to appear notably on large companies. Furthermore large firms are most suitable 
candidates to investigate the foreign investment pattern as a response of financial reforms. 
We use an unbalanced panel dataset since unbalanced panel structure has the benefit of 
partially mitigating potential selection and survival bias problems (Carpenter and Guariglia, 
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2008). The focus is given to non-financial firms, having SIC less than 6000, from period 
2000 to 2009. The intuition to restrict our dataset only to non-financial firms is that the 
accounting treatment of revenue and profits for financial firms (banks, insurance and 
investment firms) is significantly different than that in non-financial firms. Therefore, it is not 
appropriate to compare the investment policies of such firms with non-financial firms. We 
focus on listed firms mainly for two reasons. First, since our estimation model investigates 
the effect of reform through credit supply and foreign listing therefore, only publically listed 
firms are appropriate for this study. Second, the quality of the accounting data is higher for 
listed firms. 
 
Our sample selection criterion approves only such firms which have observations for at least 
5 years which permit us to observe the variation in firm’s financing behaviour. Firm level 
data is eliminated if a firm has missing values for explanatory variables. In addition, we try to 
mitigate the effect of outliers and errors in the data by excluding all observations for which 
variables have extreme deviating values from their means. Following Ratti et al. (2008) we 
exclude the observations with I/K above 2.5, CF/K above 0.7, S/K above 20 and D/K above 
10. The number of observations dropped because of this criterion is 41. We also eliminate the 
firm-years if their values for capital stock and sale are found negative. There were only 5 
firm-years observations containing negative value of either capital stock or net sale. In total, 
46 observations have been removed from the sample. After applying these restrictions and 
screening for apparent coding errors and missing variables, an unbalanced panel of 4813 
firm-year observations left for estimation.   
 




3.6.1.  Dependent variable 
The total investment is measured as the change in capital stock by the end of the accounting 
year, net of depreciation. i.e. It = Kt – Kt-1 + Depreciation. Depreciation in each year is 
calculated as the difference between the accumulated depreciation of the current year and that 
of the previous year. Whereas, capital stock is calculated as the item “Tangible Fixed Assets” 
on the balance sheets, which includes accumulated depreciation. Specifically, it is the sum of 
machinery, plants, equipment, buildings, land, property, other tangible assets, and 
construction-in-progress. Inventories are reported separately and not included in the 
calculations.  
ORBIS does not report separate balance sheet figures for firm foreign investment; therefore 
we revert to financial statements of firm foreign subsidiaries and treat change in their capital 
stock from previous year plus depreciation as a firm foreign investment. Regarding firm’s 
domestic investment, the difference between total investment and foreign investment is 
considered as domestic investment of a firm.  
 
3.6.2. Independent variable 
 
The variable of interest, CF, is operating cash flow at time t, which is calculated as operating 
income at time t plus depreciation at time t. A firm is considered as financially constrained if 
it does not has access to external finance to undertake investment opportunities and has to 
rely mostly on internal capital. Therefore, we use investment-cash flow sensitivity as a 
measure of financial constraints. A significant and positive coefficient on cash flow would be 




For our variable YSR, we consider two elements of financial reform; banking sector and 
interest rate reforms; and securities markets and financial institutions reforms. We mark the 
year of introducing these reforms and years since then are taken as the value of YSR. In doing 
so, we establish the reform launching years 1991 and 1993 for India, and China, respectively. 
In doing so, a time variant digit is used which represents the difference between the time 
period t and reforms cut-off year. In estimation, this variable (YSR) interacts with cash flow 
variable. Theoretically, the negative sign on this interactive term would be the indicator of 
elimination or reduction of financial constraints to firm investment. Similarly, a variable for 
foreign listing, (FList), measured as takes value 1 if a firm is internationally listed in a given 
year, is also interacted with cash flow variable to capture the impact of financial reforms in 
terms of foreign listing. A negative and statistically significant sign on interactive term would 
indicate that foreign listing has successfully reduced the financial constraints to firm 
investment.  
 
Firm debt is measured as total debt of a firm, including long-term and short-term, and sale is 
measured as firm’s total sale for a specific period. The information on firm business group 
affiliation and state-ownership is also taken from financial statements of respective firms. A 
firm is defined as group affiliated firm if it belongs to any business group, and we define a 
firm as being state-owned if there is presence of government ownership in any fraction. 
Effects of business groups is captured by a dummies, BG taking the value 1 if a firm is 
affiliated to business group in a given year, otherwise 0. State-ownership SOE is measure a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if there is presence of government ownership in any fraction, 






Table 3.1: Variable construction 
Variables Acronym Definition Source 
Investment I Change in net capital stock from period t-1 to t, plus 






 Change in net capital stock from period t-1 to t, plus 






 Difference between total investment and foreign investment  
Capital stock K Tangible assets of period t ORBIS 





YSR Number of years since reforms. The year of major financial 
reforms is 1991 and 1993 for India and China, respectively. 
 
Net sale S Total sale at the end of period t ORBIS 
Total Debt D Book value of total debt at the end of period t ORBIS 
Foreign listing  FList A dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm is internationally 
listed, 0 otherwise.  
ORBIS 
Business group BG A dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm is affiliated to 
business group, 0 otherwise 
ORBIS 
State-ownership SOE A dummy variable taking value 1 if there is presence of 









Chapter 4:  Findings and Discussion 
The research hypotheses discussed earlier in Chapter 3 are tested in this chapter.  In 
particular, this chapter starts with the data descriptive of the used variables in the analysis. It 
follows with the analysis and discussion of estimated results.  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
We tabulate the descriptive statistics per country in Table 4.1, and the first thing to notice is 
that the distribution of firm total investment to capital stock ratio varies widely across 
countries. This measure can be thought of as the intensity of investment for the firm. Based 
on this measure, Chinese firms are investing heavily, almost 86% to their capital stock, 
compared to 53% for Indian firms. The similar pattern is observed for foreign and domestic 
investment. Chinese firms are leading the foreign and domestic investment. Next, the fraction 
of sales to capital stock can be seen as fixed assets turnover ratio, which measures the 
operational efficiency of the firm. There is no significant difference is found in sale volume 
among Indian and Chinese firms. The operational efficiency for Indian and Chinese firms is 
found 3.095 and 3.009, respectively.  
The cash‐flow ratio is particularly high for Indian firms, about 23%, while Chinese firms 
maintain this ratio at 18.6%. We may attribute the Indian higher cash flow ratio to the fact 
that sampled firms hold large cash stock as a buffer to protect themselves against adverse 
cash flow shocks. In addition, as Opler et al., (1999) pointed out firms with low access to the 
capital market tend to hold higher cash because of transactional and/or precautionary 
motives. Transactional motive for holding cash implies that firm holds cash to save on the 
transaction costs of raising funds from external sources and to avoid having to liquidate assets 
to make payments. On the other hand, precautionary motive asserts that firm holds cash 
reserves to deal arduous circumstances and to continue investing in positive NPV projects 
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during the periods when external financing is costly because of information asymmetric 
problem.  
For debt utilization, there is not a significant difference among Indian and Chinese firms. 
Indian firms have leverage ratio of 1.912, while for Chinese firms this ratio about 1.905. 
Regarding business group affiliation, firms operating in both emerging countries, Indian and 
China, have higher trend to affiliate themselves to a certain business group. In particular, in 
Indian market, 61% firms are found to be affiliated to a business group, while 44% firms are 
associated to a business group in China.   
State ownership is quite common among Chinese sampled firms. More than 81% firms have 
state ownership in any fraction whereas this aspect is not quite common among Indian firms. 
Last, raising finance through foreign listing is quite common in Indian firms, showing (81%) 
of firms are listed abroad, however, foreign listing is exceptionally lower for Chinese firms 
(41%) reflecting their dependence on leverage.     
Table 4.1: Mean values of variables across countries 




























BG 0.610 0.440 
 
SOE 0.026 0.811 
 




4.2. Estimated results for total investment 
The main results for firm total investment are based on the model given in equations (10-12) 
and are reported in Table 4.2. Columns (1) to (3) presents the Indian sampled firms and 
Chinese sampled firms are presented in columns (4) to (6). We include all large firms 
operating in developed countries from 2000-2009, with the exception of financial firms.  
In columns (1), (2) and (3), we first estimate the degree of financial constraints to firm’s total 
investment of Indian firms, then impact of business groups and state-ownership on financial 
constraints is captured, and last, impact of financial reforms is incorporated through 
introducing variables credit supply and foreign listing. Results in specification (1) show that 
firm total investment depends on investment of previous year. The coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level. The coefficient for cash flow ( 2) is negative but 
statistically insignificant. However, second and third specification shows the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on cash flow, indicating that firms are financially 
constrained in the market. Next, we capture the impact of business group affiliation and state-
ownership on the extent of financial constraints. Results indicate that the interaction of 
business group and cash flow ( 3) achieved negative and statistically significant sign for both 
specifications. This is supportive of the idea that the access to financial constraints of group 
affiliated firms is different to that of independent firms. Specifically, consistent with market 
failure and resource sharing views of business groups, these results indicate that the 
investment of group affiliated firms is less sensitive to the availability of internal capital. 
Next, the state-ownership ( 4) entered in both models with negative sign but could not 
achieve the statistical significance, implying that state ownership does not effect on the 
financial constraints to firm overall investment in Indian market. With respect to hypotheses 
of this study  2 > 0,  3 < 0,  4 < 0, results in specification (2) and (3) supports the first 
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hypothesis ( 2 > 0) that firms are financially constrained, while these constraints are 
decreased because of group affiliation ( 3 < 0) is strongly supported by all specifications. 
Lastly, results testing the impact of state-ownership show that state-ownership is not relevant 
to firm investment for Indian firms. In sum, the results are in line with the work of Ghosh 
(2006) and Bhaduri (2006) that report financial constraints in Indian market.  
The results for the first variable measuring impact of financial reforms on the severity of 
financial constraints (supply of funds proxied by YSR) show that indeed financial reforms has 
increased the amount of credit for firm investment and financial constraints have reduced. 
The coefficients are negative and statistically significant at 1% level in specifications (2) and 
(3). The second variable capturing effects of financial reforms, foreign listing, is also found 
to have negative but statistically insignificant. Our result strengthens the hypothesis regarding 
positive impact of financial reforms in terms of credit supply ( 5 < 0). However, we could not 
support our hypothesis for positive impact of foreign listing on financial constraints. 
Regarding other control variables used in analysis, debt is found to have positive but 
insignificant relationship with investment, whereas, sale maintains positive and statistically 
significant relationship with firm’s total investment.    
Next, we repeat the analysis and test the hypotheses for the Chinese sample. Results show 
that lagged investment positively and significantly associates with the current investment 
level in all specifications representing the firm’s dependence on previous investment level. 
Next, the coefficient on cash flow variable is found to have positive and statistically 
significant sign in all specifications. It indicates that firms are financially constrained in the 
Chinese market. This result supports our hypothesis ( 2 > 0) stating the existence of financial 
constraints in the Chinese market. In contrast to Indian firms, business group affiliation is not 
found to be valuable in reduction of financial constraints in Chinese market. Consistent with 
hypothesis ( 4 < 0) state-ownership reduces financial constraints to total investment and 
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result in last specification is statistically significant at 10% level. This result shows that 
having a higher ratio of state-ownership reduces the extent to which the firm is financially 
constrained. This result is line with previous studies (Firth et al., 2008; Poncet et al., 2010) 
that conclude firms with a large presence of state-ownership experience less or no financial 
constraints. In sum, as conjectured, we find that private firms in China significantly rely on 
their cash flow to finance their investments, which is evidence of credit constraints, while 
state-ownership reduce these financial constraints.   
The results for the impact of financial reforms are alike to earlier finding for Indian firms. 
The coefficient for interaction between cash flow and credit supply ( 5) is negative and 
statistically significant. It indicates that financial reforms reduce financial constraints through 
providing more credit for investment. The next variable measuring the impact of financial 
reforms through foreign listing ( 6) is found to have negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficient, indicating that firms foreign listing does not have any impact on financial 
constraints to investment. These results support our hypothesis ( 5 < 0) for the effective role 
of financial reforms in reduction of financial constraints. These results strengthen the findings 
of and Ponet et al., (2010); and Huang (2003) that report presence of credit constraints in 
Chinese market and financial reforms in terms of increased credit supply has significantly 
reduced the firm’s dependence on internal capital for investment.  
The Sargan/Hansen   test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject the validity of the 
instruments in all specifications. The test of second order serial correlation of the error term 
in all specifications indicates that the error term does not exhibit second order correlation. 
Overall, results for investment-cash flow sensitivity support our hypothesis for both Indian 
and Chinese sample, impact of business group affiliation and state-ownership support our 
hypotheses for Indian and Chinese sample, respectively. Hypothesis regarding impact of 
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financial reforms in terms of credit supply is strongly supported in both Indian and Chinese 
samples.          
Table 4.2: GMM-IV estimation results for total investment 
 Indian firms  Chinese firms 





























































  -0.041** 
(0.046) 





   
-2.621 
(2.527) 

























































Number of firms 287 287 287  214 214 214 




0.000 0.579 0.173  0.000 0.344 0.399 
AR(2) p-value 0.830 0.380 0.840  0.211 0.043 0.668 
Specification (1), (2) and (3) estimate the model (10), (11), and (12), respectively. The dependent variable is 
total investment. Second lag of all regressor are also employed as instruments. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
5.2. Estimated results for domestic and foreign investment 
The estimated results for domestic investment are presented in table 5.2. The model 
specifications in equation (10-12) are re-estimated with only domestic investment for Indian 
and Chinese firms. The direction of relationship and statistical significance follows the earlier 
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pattern of total investment. The cash flow variable enters the model with positive statistically 
significant sign in specifications. It indicates that both Indian and Chinese firms are 
financially constrained for domestic investment. Results for the impact of business group 
affiliation and state-ownership are similar to earlier findings for total investment in both 
samples. Business group affiliation and state-ownership reduces financial constraints to 
domestic investment of Indian and Chinese firms, respectively.    
Table 4.3: GMM-IV estimation results for domestic investment 
 Indian firms  Chinese firms 





























































  -0.042** 
(0.039) 





   
-1.605 
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Number of firms 287 287 287  214 214 214 




0.000 0.596 0.179  0.000 0.534 0.176 
AR(2) p-value 0.759 0.483 0.943  0.994 0.294 0.678 
Specification (1), (2) and (3) estimate the model (10), (11), and (12), respectively. The dependent variable is 
domestic investment. Second lag of all regressor are also employed as instruments. Standard errors are presented 




The estimated result for the impact of financial reforms on domestic investment is similar to 
earlier finding. Results for both samples reveal that financial reforms decrease financial 
constraints to domestic investment by increasing the supply of credit in the markets. These 
results for domestic investment also support our hypothesis for increased supply of credit ( 5 
< 0) in the domestic market to facilitate domestic investment. Nevertheless, our results again, 
do not support the positive role of foreign listing in mitigating financial constraints.  
 
Regarding control variables, sale is found to have positive and significant relationship with 
domestic investment for Indian firms. The p-values of Hansen test in all specifications 
indicate that it is impossible to reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions 
are valid.     
    
Table 5.3 shows the results for foreign investment. The finding on lagged foreign investment 
is similar to earlier estimations for total and domestic investment; however, we lost the 
statistical significance for Indian firms. The cash flow coefficient in all specification is 
positive and statistically significant for Indian firms and Chinese firms. It indicates that firms 
in India and China are financially constrained for foreign investment. Next, unlike previous 
findings, business group affiliation does not facilitate Indian firms to secure credit from 
international market for foreign investment. However, state-ownership among Chinese firm 
still has positive impact and reduces financial constraints for foreign investment. This result 






Table 4.4: GMM-IV estimation results for foreign investment 
 Indian firms  Chinese firms 





























































  -0.069** 
(0.039) 





   
-0.473 
(0.516) 

























































Number of firms 287 287 287  214 214 214 




0.061 0.184 0.570  0.077 0.158 0.141 
AR(2) p-value 0.534 0.456 0.195  0.159 0.312 0.165 
Specification (1), (2) and (3) estimate the model (10), (11), and (12), respectively. The dependent variable is 
foreign investment. Second lag of all regressor are also employed as instruments. Standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
The estimated effect of financial reforms in terms of credit supply remained same for foreign 
investment. The coefficient on interaction term ( 5) across both samples is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that both Indian and Chinese firms are benefited from 
increased credit supply for foreign investment. The achieved result supports our hypothesis 
for positive impact of financial reform on foreign investment ( 5 < 0). Next, we test that 
whether financial reforms have mitigated the financial constraints to foreign investment by 
facilitating firms to list abroad. Results show that such impact is not observable in both 
samples, though coefficient is negative but statistical significance is not achieved. Results for 
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both samples only support our hypothesis for increased credit supply ( 5 < 0) for foreign 
listing. The Sargan/Hansen  test  does  not  provide  evidence  against  the  specification  and  
the choice  of  instruments.  
In sum, results establish that financial reforms decrease financing constraints, measured by 
supply of credit to firm’s overall investment as well as domestic and foreign investment.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This chapter provides a summary of the key findings from our thesis and limitation of this 
study.  
6.1.  Concluding remarks  
Though the problem of financial constraints is relevant to all markets around the globe but is 
more pertinent to developing economies. To overcome market financial frictions, since the 
beginning of 90’s, several developing countries, including India and China have initiated 
financial reforms process. These financial market reforms mainly include the step like 
improving the bank’s screening capabilities to mitigate information asymmetry issues in the 
capital market, removal of credit ceiling and administrative controls on interest rate, 
development of security and financial markets to reduce the cost of external financing, and 
removing the barriers to entry in the banking sector to promote finance penetration in the 
market, were introduced in this regard. Besides such optimistic intentions with reforms, the 
experience of last two decades of financial crises increased doubts about the potential 
benefits from financial reforms. As markets are getting more exposed to the whims of 
international capital market inflows, new opportunities of disruptive speculative financial 
activity emerged, leading to macro-economic instability with implications for private firm 
investment. 
In the last two decades, foreign investment and exports have been identified as Chinese and 
Indian economy’s main drivers to success. Therefore, using two large panels of Chinese and 
Indian non-financial firms, we examine the impacts of such financial reforms on firms’ 
foreign investment. In particular, the main objective of this thesis is to empirically investigate 
the effects of financial reforms on financial constraints to overall investment decision as well 
as the domestic and foreign investment of firms of two leading emerging economies 
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In empirical analysis, using a panel data of 501 large Indian and Chinese firms having foreign 
subsidiaries for the period from 2000 to 2009, we investigate a dynamic model derived from 
Euler equation to study the impact of financial reforms on financial constraints.  Using these 
two independent samples for each country, the baseline model is estimated separately for 
overall, foreign and domestic investment.  
Estimation results suggest that cash flow is an important determinant of firm overall 
investment. Firms from both countries are found as financially constrained in their 
investment decision. The magnitude of coefficients indicates that intensity of financial 
constraints is higher in Indian market. Motivated by the unique institutional settings of these 
economies, two firm characteristics, business group and state-ownership, are introduced in 
the estimation model to capture the effect on group affiliation and state-ownership on the 
intensity of financial constraints to investment. Results indicate that business group affiliation 
in India and state-ownership in China help firms to circumvent the market constraints to their 
investment decision. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firm use group 
affiliation and state-ownership as antidote to the existing imperfections in the market.  
Next, the impact of financial reforms on overall investment is analysed through two channels: 
credit supply and foreign listing. The estimated results show that efficiency of fund allocation 
impacts positively on investment decision in both economies, supporting the positive 
outcomes of government programs of credit supply. The magnitude of this effect is larger for 
Indian firms, representing that financial policies targeting the credit excessive supply are 
more successful in India. However, econometric results are not supportive of a foreign listing 
both in Indian and China. Financial reforms assisting firms to foreign list do not seems to 




In order to answer the question of how financial reforms affected domestic and foreign 
investment decision, the model is re-estimated for domestic and foreign investment 
independently. The estimation of Euler equations suggests that financial reforms have 
different effects for these investments. In particular, similar results emerge for domestic 
investment. Results indicate that firms both in India and China are financially constrained to 
their domestic investment. Business group affiliation and state-ownership help Indian and 
Chinese firms, respectively, in overcoming capital market imperfections. Financial reforms 
have led to an improvement in the efficiency with which funds have been allocated for 
domestic investment in both markets. However, as earlier, foreign listing don’t seem to help 
in overcoming constraints to domestic investment.  
With regard to foreign investment, our results for Chinese sample remained unchanged. 
Specifically, firms from both economies are found financially constrained for foreign 
investment. Again the magnitude is higher for Indian firms. Unexpectedly, business group 
affiliation does not have any effect for foreign investment of Indian firms. State-ownership 
continues to facilitate for foreign investment of Chinese firms. Impact of financial reforms 
remained persistent. Reforms have increased the credit supply for foreign investment in both 
countries, however, no empirical support is found for the positive effect of foreign listing on 
foreign investment.    
This study presents useful insight into the financing problems to firm investment. Financial 
reforms in terms of foreign listing in Indian and China do not seem to have had effect on the 
financial constraints faced by firms when making investment decisions. The main limitation 
of this study, that also highlights the future research avenue, exists for estimation of foreign 
investment. The financial variable used for capturing the impact of leverage on foreign 
investment could have more efficient by measuring as the fraction of foreign debt to capital 
stock rather than total debt to capital stock. Similarly, foreign sale as the proxy for firm 
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growth could control the growth effect on foreign investment more accurately than entire sale 
of a firm. However, time restraints do not allowed incorporating these aspects in empirical 
estimations. Regarding estimation, the unavailability of foreign sale and debt data restrained 
us to apply seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure for the present analysis. A SUR 
estimation method is more appropriate in this case since the firm’s both investment decisions, 
domestic and foreign, are occurring simultaneously and the factors that determine these 
investment decisions are related to each other. Such estimation conditions creating possible 
contemporaneous correlation among firms and correlate the error terms across the equations. 
Therefore, to allow for the possibility that the error terms in domestic and foreign investment 
equations may contain the same unspecified factors, both equations should be estimated 
jointly using the SUR model. 
Besides the limitations, this work also suggests some possible future research directions to 
extend our research. First, it would be interesting to examine the impact of financial reforms 
across firm age and coverage ratio. Mature and firms having higher coverage ratio hold 
sufficient internal funds, they don’t have great need to borrow and will not face financial 
constraints at similar extent. Second, this work could be extended to study the impact of 
reforms on small and medium sized firms. For doing so, similar empirical setting can be 
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